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In our past work, we had analyzed the correlation between gender standards and 
democratic standards in post-colonial North Africa, and found it to be essentially non-existent, 
despite the fact that these two standards are highly correlated worldwide, and despite the 
analytical evidence to the effect that they go hand in hand.  We revisit our previous analysis, in 
light of recent developments in North Africa and the Middle East. 
 
Keywords:  Gender Standards, Democratic Standards, North Africa, Middle East, Arab Spring, 
Arab Gender Policies. 
 
 
Introduction: Revisiting the Paradox 
In [Mili, 2009], I discuss an empirical study I had conducted in 2005-2007, in which I 
analyzed the statistical correlation between gender standards and democratic standards in post 
colonial North Africa.  Even though these two standards are highly correlated worldwide, they 
have virtually no statistical correlation in the case of North African Countries.  To justify this 
paradox, I had presented a number of different explanations, including: 
 
 Top Down Gender Policies.  The reason why gender standards and democratic standards 
are usually correlated is that the same pressures from the base that force the adoption of 
progressive gender policies also force the adoption of democratic systems of governance.  
But what happened in post colonial North Africa was that progressive gender policies 
were decided by the political class, which did not feel obligated to make any political 
concessions to match its progressive gender policies. 
 Alien Metrics.  We argue that international metrics of gender standards reflect Western 
understanding of gender equality, and may be inadequate to measure North African or 
Middle Eastern perceptions gender equality.  For example, while a Western woman may 
feel that wearing clothes that expose her physical features is a sign of freedom, a Middle 
Eastern woman may find that she prefers wearing modest clothes that protect her from 
prying looks. 
                                                          
1 Amel Mili, PhD Director, Lauder Arabic Language and Culture Program The Lauder Institute, The Wharton 
School The University of Pennsylvania 
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 Turning Maslow’s Hierarchy 
on its Head.  Whereas 
Abraham Maslow’s theory 
[Maslow, 1943; Maslow, 
1954] holds that human 
beings have a hierarchy of 
needs, that they fulfill in 
decreasing order of urgency 
and criticality, I had argued 
that when it comes to 
democratic standards, peoples 
of the Maghreb seem to have 
conceded them, because they 
perceived them as the price 
they have to pay for political 
stability and economic 
prosperity.  I had argued that 
such a bargain was necessarily unstable, and that sooner or later people would realize that 
they are getting a bad deal. 
 
I, like most people, did not expect them to make this realization so soon.  Barely a year after my 
earlier analysis was published, a policewoman got into an argument with an unlicensed fruit 
vendor in the town of Sidi Bouzid in central Tunisia, upon which she slapped him, triggering a 
sequence of events that is still playing out across the Arab world, with worldwide global 
repercussions that have yet to be understood. 
 
 
Background:  Initial Results 
In [Mili, 2009], we had conducted an empirical study intended to analyze the statistical 
correlation between gender standards and democratic standards in post-colonial North Africa.  
To this effect, I quantified gender standards by the UNDP’s Gender Development Index and 
democratic standards by the Freedom House’s CL (Civil Liberties) and PR (Political Rights) 
indices, which we added to produce a compound index that we call DI (for Democracy Index).  
We collected data on DI and GDI for the three countries of North Africa, namely Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia, for four time periods in their post colonial history, namely 1970, 1980, 
1990, and 2000.  We employed statistical correlation analysis and linear regression analysis 
between these factors, and found that they are decidedly unrelated:  their correlation for the three 
countries and four time periods is very near zero, sometimes even negative.  Because this is 
highly counterintuitive, we analyzed the correlation between GDI and DI for all the countries for 
which the UNDP has recent information (involving 162 countries), and found a correlation 
coefficient of 0.645, which satisfies us that our expectation (and intuition) was not unreasonable.  
Focusing back on North Africa, I evaluate the statistical correlation between DI and GDI for all 
the communities of countries of which North Africa is a part, and find the following results: 
 
 A correlation of 0.02 for 46 African countries. 
 A correlation of -0.30 for 16 Arab countries. 
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 A correlation of 0.03 for 43 Islamic countries. 
 A correlation of 0.71 for 18 Mediterranean countries. 
 
It appears that it is the African/ Arab/ Islamic identity of North African countries that accounts 
for the absence of statistical correlation between gender standards and democratic standards.  In 
the presence of this paradoxical situation, we had put forth a number of explanations, including 
those that are discussed in section 1, namely:  The top down nature of gender policies in North 
Africa; the use of what may an alien measure of gender standards (the United Nations’ GDI); and 
the absurd bargain that peoples of North Africa seemed to have struck with their respective 
political leaderships… at least until December 2010. 
 
 
The Arab Spring:  A Slap Heard Around the World 
Cracks in the Fortress of Arab Autocracy  
During the course of the twentieth century, the world witnessed several waves of 
democratization that swept through Latin America, much of Asia, and (after the fall of the Berlin 
wall) Eastern Europe and Russia.  So that at the dawn of the twenty first century, the only 
countries that remained firmly in the grip of autocratic regimes were Arab countries; but a 
number of circumstances, brought on by globalization and the information technology 
revolution, started to chip away at the fortress of Arab autocratic regimes.  Some of these 
circumstances are: 
 
 Al Jazeera.  This Qatar-based television network grew from modest beginnings to 
become one of the most reliable/ credible sources of information for Arab masses, and 
later one of the top media organizations in the world.  Unlike most Arab media, Al 
Jazeera is relatively independent, and is free to expose the incompetence and corruption 
of Arab regimes.  
 Wikileaks.  Wikileaks went further than Al Jazeera in exposing the incompetence and 
duplicity of Arab regimes, by showing clearly how their covert actions were totally at 
odds with their public positions. 
 Facebook.  Facebook and other social media enabled Arab masses to organize a 
challenge to Arab regimes virtually anonymously, leaving authorities powerless to 
interfere with their activities, to identify them, or to arrest them.  
 Youtube.  The availability of youtube meant that political activists could record events 
and post them for the world to see, thereby exposing the abuses of the regimes or their 
inability to control the situation. 
 
As a result of these circumstances, Arab regimes have lost credibility with their populations 
(thanks to Al Jazeera, and Wikileaks, etc), at the same time as they have lost the political 
initiative (thanks to Facebook, Twitter, etc), and the ability to control the message (thanks to 
Youtube, etc).  All that is needed to trigger a revolution is a spark. 
 
Tunisia:  The Jasmin Revolution 
The spark that triggered a wave of revolutions across the Arab world started modestly as 
a minor incident in a small town in central Tunisia, on December 17, 2010.  A policewoman 
named Fadia Hamdi harassed an unlicensed fruit vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, confiscated his 
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wares and ordered him to close shop; when he resisted, she slapped him in public.  When local 
authorities refused to meet with him and hear his grievances, he set himself on fire.  This 
triggered a wave of protests, that were fueled by pent up discontent and resentment against the 
regime; these protests spread across the country, all the way to the capital, where they 
culminated on January 14, with the fall of the Ben Ali regime, and the exile of President Ben Ali 
to Saudi Arabia.  Tunisia was subsequently governed by successive governments, until October 
23, 2011, when elections were held for a new constitutional assembly. 
 Fadia Hamdi was put on trial for her role in the December 17 incident, and was acquitted.  
Mohamed Bouazizi survived his injuries but was badly burned; he passed away on January 4
th
 
after two weeks of intensive care, without witnessing the momentous events of January 14, 2011. 
 The events of Tunisia helped other Arab peoples to conquer their fears and rise against 
their autocratic regimes; in the remainder of this section, we discuss how events unfolded for 
other Arab countries. 
 
Alternating Between Concessions and Oppression:  Egypt 
Protest movements started in Egypt on January 25, shortly after Ben Ali was sent into exile.  
Like Ben Ali, President Mubarak of Egypt alternated between two approaches to put down the 
protest movement:  making concessions to appease the protesters; and using violence to suppress 
their movement.  When neither policy seemed to work, President Mubarak stepped down on 
February 11 and relinquished power to a temporary military authority. 
 
Revolution by Civil War 
When Moammar Gadafi in Lybia, Bashar Al Assad in Syria and Ali Abdallah Saleh in 
Yemen saw (in Tunisia and Egypt) the result of  hesitating between concessions and oppression, 
they were unimpressed.  So when their respective populations rose up, they showed little 
hesitance in using oppression all the way, with varying results:  Gadafi used all his weapons (air 
force, tanks, heavy artillery) against civilian populations, until a UN resolution opened the way 
to a NATO intervention against him, culminating in an inglorious end to his 42-year regime;  
Saleh did not show much restraint either but unlike Gadafi, he has little means, and his 
opposition is relatively well armed, hence the Yemeni situation remains in a limbo;  As for 
Assad, he keeps shooting at Syrian protesters with everything he has, undeterred by pressure 
from the UN, the international community, and tha Arab League.  In Lybia, all-out repression 
has clearly failed, due in large part to NATO intervention; whether it succeeds elsewhere 
remains to be seen, but is doubtful in the medium term. 
 
Preempting Revolution with Carrots:  Morocco, Jordan 
Fearing that the successive examples of Tunisia then Egypt started to define a pattern, 
some Arab governments took the initiative, in a bid to prevent political unrest, and launched 
democratic reforms ranging from decreased executive power, to increased freedom of expression 
and political opposition, to constitutional reforms, to promises of power sharing, transparency 
and term limits.  Such was the case in Morocco and Jordan. 
 
Preempting Revolution with Sticks: Bahrain and Saudi Arabia 
At the first sign of trouble, the monarchy of Bahrain cracked down on street protesters, 
using violence, intimidation, arrests, and prison terms to crush their movement before it started.  
Other Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, provided the weaponry and the political support.  
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Also, following the events in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia reinforced its security measures, issued stern 
warnings that it will not tolerate any public disturbances, and had religious leaders issue edicts 
making loyalty to the authorities a religious duty. 
 
 
Post Arab Spring Politics:  Tunisian Elections 
First Free Elections 
Tunisia holds two enviable titles with respect to Arab revolutions:  it is home to the first 
Arab revolution; and it has (so far) the smoothest revolution (as revolutions go, it has been 
exceptionally orderly and free of violence).  Hence we focus our discussion of gender and 
revolution on Tunisia.   
Upon the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime, Tunisia had a succession of temporary 
governments, which, under pressure from street protests, had fewer and fewer members of the 
old regime.  The last, and longest serving, of these held office from March 2011 to November 
2011, when it cedes power to the new government, that was formed from the constitutional 
assembly.  The constitutional assembly is itself a temporary structure, whose responsibility is 
limited to write a new constitution and organize elections according to the terms of this 
constitution. 
The election campaign for the constitutional assembly was very short by US standards, 
since it ran from October 1
st
 to October 21
st
, 2011, though the country had been preparing for it 
through the spring and summer 2011.  The election was organized and monitored by an 
independent election commission (L’Instance Supreme Independante des Elections:  The 
Supreme Independent Council for Elections, http://www.isie.tn/).  The constitutional assembly 
has 219 seats, to be taken from predefined electoral districts.  Within each district, voters choose 
between candidate lists, which are either submitted by parties or by independent individuals.  
Each district is assigned a number of seats, depending on its population; all candidate lists in that 
district have to have a number of candidates equal to that number.  Also, each list is ranked in a 
specific order, that determines who gets elected depending on how many votes the list secures.  
If a list wins one seat, then the head of the list gains that seat; if the list wins two seats, then the 
first and second person on the list gain seats, etc..  To ensure adequate gender representation, 
lists had to alternate between female and male candidates; so in a district with nine seats, for 
example, a list whose head is a man would have five men and four women, and a list whose head 
is a woman would have five women and four men.  Despite this commendable effort of the 
election commission, there was no assurance that women would be adequately represented in the 
constitutional assembly:  Because most lists were headed by men, membership in the 
constitutional assembly would be gender-balanced only if every list wins an even number of 
seats.  But if every list wins only one seat, and all winning lists are headed by men, then no 
women would gain a seat at all. 
The period leading up to the elections was a period of great excitement in Tunisia, as 
Tunisians learned first-hand the benefits of democratic governance, and the chaos and 
uncertainty that inevitably accompany it.  Several parties that had been in a state of hibernation 
under the 23 year regime of Ben Ali sprung back to life, and many new parties arose with little 
more than a political slogan and a vague political program.  As a consequence, Tunisian voters 
were overwhelmed by the dizzying array of choices before them, most of which they had barely 
heard about.  The only two parties that enjoyed any name recognition at all were EnNahdha (the 
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renaissance, an Islamist party) and the PDP (Popular Democratic Party); both were long term 
opponents to the Ben Ali regime and both were ruthlessly silenced during his rule.   
 
Election Results 
The elections were held on Sunday October 23, 2011 under the auspices of the Tunisian 
Election Commission, and were monitored by Tunisian and International bodies; they were 
universally hailed as a great success, in terms of voter participation, poll organization, and 
transparency.  According to the independent electoral council [ISIE, 2011], the rate of 
participation among registered voters was 86.1 %, a very honorable figure by any standard, 
reflecting the faith that Tunisians have in the benefits of democracy.  The results of the election, 




Number of Seats 
Men Women Total Percent 
Percent 
Women 
EnNahdha (islamist) 50 39 89 41.01 % 43.82 % 
CPR (Center Left) 25 4 29 13.36 % 13.80 % 
Aridha (Petition) 22 4 26 11.98 % 15.38 % 
Takattol (Social Democrat) 16 4 20 9.22 % 20.00 % 
PDP (Social Democrat) 14 2 16 7.37 % 12.50 % 
PDM (Democracy, modernity ) 3 2 5 2.30 % 40.00 % 
Moubadara (Initiative) 3 2 5 2.30 % 40.00 % 
Afek (Horizons, liberal) 2 2 4 1.84 % 50.00 % 
POCT (communist) 3 0 3 1.38 % 0.00 % 
MDS (socialist) 2 0 2 0.92 % 0.00 % 
MP (Popular movement) 2 0 2 0.92 % 0.00 % 
Independents 16 0 16 7.37 % 0.00 % 
Total 158 59 217 100.00 % 27.19 % 
 
Commentary and Analysis 
Looking at these results from a gender standpoint, one is struck by three observations: 
 
 First, despite the best efforts of the elections authorities, women participation in the 
constitutional assembly is limited to 27.19 %.   
 The second observation is that paradoxically, the party that has the most women 
representatives, and (nearly) the highest female representation in its caucus, is the 
EnNahdha party, which is feared by many Tunisians to roll back some of the gains that 
women secured prior to the revolution.  To be sure, this has to do with electoral rules 
more, perhaps, than the party’s interest in women representation.  In most electoral 
districts, EnNahdha is the only party that gains more than one seat, thereby getting 
women elected, even on a list led by a man.  Because other parties are highly divided, 
they usually gain only one seat at a time, ensuring that only the head of their lists (usually 
a man) get a seat.  There was one EnNahdha list that was chaired by a woman, who 
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wasted no time showing her colors by declaring shortly after the elections that unwed 
mothers do not deserve legal protection. 
 On the face of it, these results appear to be alarming from a gender viewpoint, because 
the party that garnered most votes, and 41.01 % of the seats, is not known to be a 
champion of women’s rights.  Some members of this party would be quite happy to see 
polygamy reinstated; some believe that the solution to high unemployment is to send 
women home; and some are obsessed beyond reason by what a woman should wear and 
not wear. 
 
Yet there are a number of reasons why we believe that we should not be alarmed by these results; 
we discuss these in turn, below. 
 
 As any political consultant will confirm, winning elections has less to do with having 
good ideas, having a sound political program, and fielding good people than it has to do 
with being organized.  Due to its history, and to its grassroots organization, EnNahdha 
was able to get organized much faster than any other party, hence was much better 
positioned to win votes.  Hence we submit that the score of 40% of the vote does not 
reflect the political opinions of the Tunisian people as much as it reflects the special 
circumstances of this particular election. 
 Even assuming that the current poll reflects the political tendencies of the Tunisian 
electorate, EnNahdha cannot govern by itself, and has to form a coalition with other 
parties; no other party will ever bargain away Tunisia’s cherished gains in terms of 
gender legislation. 
 As can be seen from the table above, 39 out of the 89 members of the constitutional 
assembly are women; this constitutes 43.82 percent of the EnNahdha caucus.  It is fair to 
assume that on critical gender matters, these members will not caucus with EnNahdha 
against their own interest, leaving only 50 members out of 217 who could vote on 
gender-hostile measures. 
 Unlike subsequent governments, the constitutional assembly has a short-term mandate, 
which is limited to writing the constitution, while a temporary government drawn from a 
coalition of winning parties runs the day to day operations of the country.  This short 
term mandate has two beneficial effects:  First, it will give Tunisians an opportunity to 
watch EnNahdha in power, and to see for themselves that religious doctrine alone is not 
sufficient to govern; second, it will give time to the other parties to consolidate, in light of 
their performance at these elections, and to offer fewer and better alternatives to Tunisian 
voters than the overcrowded field they currently have. 
 In addition to its distinguished role with respect to Arab revolutions, Tunisia holds a 
distinguished title with respect to gender relations:  On August 13, 1956, under the 
leadership of then-President Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia enacted a comprehensive body of 
legislation that defied centuries-old traditions and customs, and replaced with modern 
legislation that protected the right of women in terms of inheritance, marriage, divorce, 
child custody, property ownership, etc.  With the possible exception of marginal 
extremists, all Tunisians cherish these laws, credit them for turning Tunisia into a modern 
progressive society, consider them as an important part of the country’s social fabric, and 
will never tolerate that any government rolls these back. 
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 Of course, EnNahdha leadership has been repeating that it has no intention to roll back 
any legislation pertaining to women’s rights, and that it will not interfere with dress code 
at the beach, nor advocate female unemployment as a solution to economic problems.  
While one can take them at their word, many Tunisians feel that this moderate posturing 
is merely an electoral ploy; if it is an electoral ploy, it will not be uncovered during the 
tenure of the current temporary government. 
 Some observers see women wearing headscarves as a sign that they are embracing an 
earlier era, prior to Bourguiba’s revolutionary gender legislation.  But we argue that the 
headscarves that women wear nowadays reflect a totally different gender symbol from 
those that were used prior to Tunisia’s gender revolution.  Whereas in the past those veils 
reflected a woman’s submission to the whim of the men in their lives (fathers or brothers 
when they are young, husbands when they grow up), today’s headscarves are a much 
more assertive individual decision that is neither initiated by men nor even approved by 
them.  It is driven by issues of faith, identity, and freedom of expression.  Policymakers 
would do well not to confuse these different interpretations. 
 
Ultimately, the most secure warranty of women’s right in Tunisia is the Tunisian people: having 
conquered their fears, they have put their leaders on notice that they will not tolerate any 
violation of their cherished values. 
 
 
Revisiting the Paradox: On Gender and Democracy 
In [Mili, 2009], we had identified three premises that may explain the paradox of the discrepancy 
between gender standards and political standards in the Maghreb (the same observation was 
made about Arab countries in general):  The fact that gender policies were enacted top down; the 
fact that we used the UN’s GDI metrics to reflect gender standards; and the fact that Arab 
populations appear to have inverted Maslow’s hierarchy.  We review these three premises in 
light of the discussions of this paper: 
 
 Gender policies enacted top down.  In the new political landscape, we anticipate that 
political decisions are no longer going to be done top down, as this is incompatible with 
democratic principles and modus operandi. 
 GDI as an alien metric.  While the GDI metric was not specifically tailored to Arab 
women, we feel that it is by and large an adequate reflection of gender development; also, 
we suspect that even if we had used an Arab-specific metric of gender development in 
our earlier study [Mili, 2009], we would still have found the same result. 
 Inverting Maslow’s hierarchy.  With the events of the Arab Spring, Arab populations 
have shown that their Maslow hierarchy is properly oriented: they have recognized that 
conceding political freedoms for economic security, even if it were more than a 
perception, is a bad bargain.  They now believe they can have economic security through 




The first free election in Tunisia has yielded the victory of an Islamist party.  The fall of the 
Mubarak regime in Egypt has enabled long-oppressed Islamist forces to operate more assertively 
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and more freely.  On the day when Gadafi is defeated and his 42-year regime ends, the National 
Transitional Council of Lybia announces that it wants to enact Islamic legislation in Lybia.  It 
would be a cruel irony if by overthrowing their autocratic regimes, the peoples of Tunisia, Egypt 
and Lybia are substituting them for regimes that, under the cover of enacting religious law, may 
be causing great harm to gender development in their countries.  For the reasons I discussed in 
section 4.3, I don’t believe this fear is justified.  First, because I do not believe that in the case of 
Tunisia, and perhaps of Egypt and Lybia, the rule of an Islamist party is inevitable.  Second, if it 
were, I do not think that it leads necessarily to a degradation in gender development.  In the days 
leading up to the October elections, Tunisia hosted Prime Minister Recep Taieb Erdogan, who 
reminded us that it is possible for an Islamic inspired party, such as his, to govern a country that 







[ISIE, 2011]:  Instance Supreme Independante des Elections.  Tunisia, 2011.  
http://www.isie.tn/.  
[Maslow, 1943]:  A.H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, Psychological Review 50(4) 
(1943): pages 370-96. 
[Maslow, 1954]:  Maslow, Abraham (1954). Motivation and Personality. New York: Harper. 
pp. 236. ISBN 0060419873. 
[Mili, 2009]:  Mili, Amel.  Gender Standards vs. Democratic Standards.  Examples and Counter 
Examples.  Journal of International Womens Studies, vol 11, No 2, November 2009. 
[Tunisie Etudes, 2011]:  Liste des Membres de l’Assemblee Constituante, Resultat des 
Elections Tunisie 2011.  http://tunisie-etudes.info/.  
